Living document · updated as rulings land
Prediction markets and state gaming law: where the courts stand
Sports event contracts, the Commodity Exchange Act, state gambling statutes and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, in date order: what each court held, what it left open, and what is still pending.
By K. Aaron Pasch
- Current to
- Sep 21, 2026
- Last re-checked
- Sep 21, 2026
- Next re-check due
- Sep 28, 2026
- Read at the source
- 13 of 22 entries
Where each court of appeals stands
Select a court to see what it decided, where its case stands, and the forecast for it.
The bench and the parties
Sketches, not likenesses. Select a name to see what they wrote in their own words and the ruling it sits in. Each card says which way the person comes down on the question the page turns on: for prediction markets (the exchange’s federal-preemption position) or against (the states’ and tribes’ position).
3d Cir. · Apr. 6, 2026 · KalshiEX LLC v. Flaherty
9th Cir. · Aug. 28, 2026 · KalshiEX, LLC v. Assad
9th Cir. · Sept. 16, 2026 · Blue Lake Rancheria v. Kalshi, Inc.
6th Cir. · Apr. 24, 2026 · KalshiEX LLC v. Schuler
6th Cir. · July 30, 2026 · KalshiEX LLC v. Schuler
S.D.N.Y. · July 7, 2026 · KalshiEX LLC v. Williams
D. Minn. · July 27, 2026 · United States and CFTC v. Minnesota
D.N.J. · Apr. 28, 2025 · KalshiEX v. Flaherty (preliminary injunction)
E.D. Wis. · July 28, 2026 · United States v. State of Wisconsin
The parties
Where each open question is heading
Forecasts as of Sep 21, 2026. Each is a probability with the range it was set in, the confidence behind it, what drives it and what would move it. They are analysis, not a guarantee, and each moves when a ruling lands: the change log records every move.
Supreme Court
Will the Supreme Court grant cert on the swaps/preemption question, and by when?
57% About evenrange 42–70 · low confidence
Court grants cert on the swaps/CEA-preemption question (Flaherty, a companion, or a consolidated Kalshi petition from Assad) by Jun 30 2027. Complement (43%) = denial, hold, or a grant only after Jun 30 2027.
Timing. Cumulative grant odds: by Dec 31 2026 22%; by Jan 16 2027 (last grants for April argument) 33%; by Jun 30 2027 57%; by Jun 30 2028 76%. Modal window Dec 2026-Jan 2027. Docketed Sept 8 as No. 26-299; response due Oct 8; Kalshi moved for an extension on Sept 18.
What drives it, and what would change it
Drivers
- Acknowledged conflict: Assad (9th Cir., Aug 28) expressly disagrees with Flaherty (3d Cir., Apr 6) on whether sports contracts are swaps, and NJ pleads an irreconcilable split.
- The split is narrower than NJ frames it: Assad accepts that section 2(a)(1)(A) preempts state regulation of DCM-traded swaps and agrees the CEA is comprehensive; the fight is the swap definition plus 17 CFR 40.11. Narrowness lowers grant odds.
- Stakes are unusually high: 44 states, tribes, CFTC/US as plaintiff in nine suits, about 20 states in litigation, $16.89B in state sports revenue, multiple state laws enjoined. Federal-agency and multi-sovereign interest lifts grant odds.
- Vehicle risk: Flaherty is a PI appeal under a 'reasonable chance' standard, though NJ says the courts decided the merits; Assad is also PI/abuse-of-discretion. Interlocutory posture trims odds modestly, not fatally.
- Percolation and agency action: 4th, 6th, 2d and 7th Circuits and Mass. SJC are pending, and the CFTC NPRM would rewrite 40.11, on which Assad partly rests. Kalshi and the SG can cite both to urge waiting.
What would change it
- SG or CFTC brief supporting cert, or a Rule 11 cert-before-judgment petition in a US-plaintiff case: raise to about 70%.
- A 4th or 6th Circuit ruling for Kalshi (2-2 split) raises odds 10+ points; both ruling against Kalshi and Kalshi then petitioning raises about 8 points.
- CFTC final rule amending 40.11 before the conference, or Ninth Circuit en banc grant: lower 8-12 points (hold or deny to await effect).
Supreme Court, if it decides
If the Supreme Court decides the question, probability it holds sports event contracts are swaps preempting state gambling law.
21% Less likely than notrange 12–32 · low confidence
Court holds sports event contracts are swaps and CEA preempts state gambling law as applied (Kalshi/CFTC win). Alternatives: not swaps 42%; swaps but no preemption 29%; vacate or other 8%.
Timing. Conditional on a grant. Decision by Jun 2027 only if cert is granted by about Jan 16 2027 (about 33% overall); otherwise OT2027, decision by Jun 2028.
What drives it, and what would change it
Drivers
- Text-and-context majority path: Assad and NJ use elephant-in-a-mousehole, West Virginia v. EPA and Learning Resources v. Trump (607 U.S. 229 (2026)); Judge Lee finds the natural meaning of 'event' excludes a game's outcome.
- Scope path: Williams and the Sixth Circuit motions panel reject field and conflict preemption even assuming swaps; NJ cites the Kagan and Sotomayor Kurns concurrences that an agency grant does not oust state law.
- Pro-Kalshi path: the swap text is broad (Assad concedes a 'colorable textual basis'), every court accepts that 2(a)(1)(A) preempts DCM-swap regulation, and the executive branch backs preemption.
- Fact overhang: 'legal sports betting' marketing, mirrored odds and parlays, and the 2(e) reductio that Caesars would violate the CEA.
- Regulatory overhang: the NPRM defines gaming to include professional sports yet calls aggregate-outcome sports contracts unlikely to be contrary to the public interest; a final rule reshapes the 40.11 track.
What would change it
- CFTC final rule expressly treating sports contracts as swaps within exclusive jurisdiction: raise to about 28%.
- A question limited to section 2(a)(1)(A) express preemption (not swap definition): raise to about 30%.
- Two more circuits adopting 'not swaps' or 'no preemption even if swaps': lower to about 14%.
Sixth Circuit
How will the Sixth Circuit merits panel (Clay, Gibbons, Bloomekatz) rule in Nos. 26-3196/26-5235, and when?
72% Likelyrange 60–82 · medium confidence
Panel affirms denial of Kalshi's PI (Ohio prevails). Reversal for Kalshi 18%; other disposition (vacatur, narrow or equities-only ruling) 10%.
Timing. decision by Oct 31 2026 50%; by Dec 31 2026 82%; by Mar 31 2027 95%. Expedited appeal, argued Jul 30, no decision as of Sep 8.
What drives it, and what would change it
Drivers
- The motions panel (Batchelder, Murphy, Ritz) found preemption 'largely in equipoise (if not favoring Ohio)' on express, field and conflict theories; the merits judges differ and are not bound, so this is evidence, not precedent.
- That panel assumed swaps without deciding and rested on scope: the exclusive-jurisdiction clause names the agency, two savings clauses, and 16(e)(2) preempts gaming law only in limited cases. Those reasons survive whichever way the swap question goes.
- The impartial-access impossibility argument was rejected, the same result as Assad and Williams.
- Inference from numbering (not in files): 26-5235 may be a Tennessee appeal from the Orgel injunction; if so, an affirmance against Kalshi likely also reverses that injunction.
What would change it
- An opinion holding sports contracts are swaps and section 2(a)(1)(A) expressly preempts: Sixth Circuit joins Flaherty, and Kalshi odds rise to roughly 65%.
- Silence past Oct 31 signals a separate writing: outcome odds move little, en banc and cert odds rise.
- A CFTC final rule declaring sports contracts within exclusive jurisdiction before decision: shifts 6-8 points toward Kalshi.
Fourth Circuit
How and when will the Fourth Circuit decide KalshiEX v. Martin, No. 25-1892?
70% Likelyrange 56–80 · medium confidence
Affirms D. Md. denial of Kalshi's PI (Maryland prevails). Reversal for Kalshi 20%; other (remand, vacatur on equities) 10%.
Timing. decision by Oct 31 2026 33%; by Dec 31 2026 58%; by Mar 31 2027 85%. Argued May 7; 4.5 months without decision suggests a divided panel or long opinion.
What drives it, and what would change it
Drivers
- D. Md. (793 F.Supp.3d 667, Aug 1 2025) rejected field and conflict preemption; its Special Rule reasoning is quoted approvingly in Williams and adopted in substance by the Sixth Circuit motions panel.
- Assad (Aug 28) and Blue Lake (Sep 16) post-date argument: a panel writing now faces one circuit opinion for Kalshi (Flaherty, 2-1) and two 9th Cir. opinions against, from differently composed panels.
- The Sixth Circuit cites Fourth Circuit authority that gambling regulation lies 'at the heart of the state's police power', which supports the presumption against preemption.
- Long silence raises the chance of a separate writing; that moves outcome odds little but raises en banc and cert-vehicle odds.
What would change it
- A published opinion adopting Flaherty's swap holding: raises Kalshi odds to about 60% and cert odds sharply.
- A CFTC final rule before decision that changes 40.11: likely prompts supplemental briefing and delay.
- An en banc order or request for supplemental letters on Assad/Blue Lake: signals a broader opinion, no change in direction.
Second Circuit
Will the Second Circuit affirm the denial of Kalshi's preliminary injunction against the New York State Gaming Commission officials (No. 26-1835)?
64% Likelyrange 50–74 · low confidence
Affirm the denial of a preliminary injunction.
Timing. Appeal docketed Jul 8, 2026; the S.D.N.Y. denied an injunction pending appeal on Jul 27 (per NY petition). Whether Kalshi sought an injunction pending appeal or expedition in the Second Circuit is not in the documents. Forecast: decision by Dec 31, 2026 about 12%; by Jun 30, 2027 about 55%.
What drives it, and what would change it
Drivers
- Heightened standard, abuse-of-discretion review, and an opinion that assumed swap status, so affirmance need not resolve the swap split.
- Kalshi's Second Circuit authority (Leist; Phillips) is unaddressed by the district court and is the main path to reversal.
- Given the 3d/9th split, the panel writes on the swap definition about 35% of the time; Second Circuit precedent in the record (Leist, Phillips) is more Kalshi-friendly than the Fourth or Sixth Circuit authority in the record.
- Panel, argument date and briefing schedule.
What would change it
- A panel treating Leist as binding field preemption of state gambling law on DCM swaps.
- A New York state-court TRO producing concrete irreparable-harm evidence.
- A CFTC final rule, a Supreme Court grant in Flaherty, or a Second Circuit hold pending certiorari.
Seventh Circuit
How and when will the Seventh Circuit rule in Nos. 26-2675/26-2696 (US v. Wisconsin line)?
55% About evenrange 40–68 · low confidence
Seventh Circuit sides with Wisconsin (affirms E.D. Wis. Jul 29 ruling). Reversal for the US/Kalshi 35%; other 10%.
Timing. decision by Dec 31 2026 20%; by Jun 30 2027 70%. Appeals were docketed after Jul 29, so briefing likely runs into Q4 2026.
What drives it, and what would change it
Drivers
- Evidence gap: the E.D. Wis. opinion is not in the files; only NJ's list shows that court sided with states in US v. Wisc., No. 26-C-749, Jul 29. Direction of each appeal is inferred.
- Seventh Circuit precedent cuts both ways: American Agricultural Movement found Congress did not preempt the futures field but preempts state law that directly affects trading on a futures market.
- Executive-branch weight: the US/CFTC is a party, but Assad refuses deference on the swap question (Loper Bright), and D. Minn. found CFTC standing sufficient only 'at this stage'.
- its own precedent makes the Seventh Circuit the likeliest circuit to accept conflict preemption for state laws that directly hit a futures market, which is why odds for the state are only 55%.
What would change it
- An order on a stay or injunction pending appeal: a grant moves odds to about 50% for the US/Kalshi.
- Access to the E.D. Wis. opinion showing it rests on 'not swaps' (weaker for reversal) versus scope only (stronger for reversal).
- Fourth or Sixth Circuit decisions arriving first: same-direction rulings raise state odds 5-8 points.
New York v. Kalshi
Will NY AG v. KalshiEX (S.D.N.Y. No. 1:26-cv-06550, removed Jul 31) be remanded to state court or stay in S.D.N.Y.?
62% Likelyrange 50–78 · low confidence
Remand to N.Y. Supreme Court ordered (in whole, or at least as to the AG's state-law claims). Stays in S.D.N.Y. 30%.
Timing. remand ruling by Oct 31 2026 35%; by Dec 31 2026 62%. The court may rule first on the TRO motion or defer to related S.D.N.Y. matters. Remand fully briefed Aug 28.
What drives it, and what would change it
Drivers
- Well-pleaded complaint: the AG petition pleads state constitution, Penal Law, Racing Law and Executive Law 63(12) violations; preemption is a defense, and nothing in the files shows complete preemption under the CEA.
- The Wire Act predicate (para.12(g)) is the best federal hook, but the state-law grounds independently support the same relief, which weakens embedded-federal-question jurisdiction.
- The CFTC's own Aug 11 emergency order says the action 'may be delayed by remand proceedings', signalling the agency itself expects remand risk.
- Evidence gap: the notice of removal, assigned judge and Kalshi's asserted basis are not in the files. Related S.D.N.Y. matters: Kalshi v. Williams (PI denied Jul 7) and US v. New York, 1:26-cv-3404.
What would change it
- Assignment as related to a judge who has accepted preemption arguments, or a removal notice resting on federal-officer status: lowers remand to about 45%.
- CFTC or US intervention pressing complete-preemption or a federal forum: lowers remand 8-10 points.
- A state-court TRO ruling before remand is decided would moot urgency and raise remand odds.
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
How and when will the Massachusetts SJC decide SJC-13906 (Commonwealth v. KalshiEX)?
80% Likelyrange 66–90 · low confidence
SJC rules for the Commonwealth (Kalshi loses its preemption defense; injunction ruling stands). Ruling for Kalshi 20%.
Timing. decision by Oct 31 2026 65%; by Dec 31 2026 88%. Argued early May; the SJC's usual ~130-day decision window (own knowledge, not in files) has run or is expiring.
What drives it, and what would change it
Drivers
- The Superior Court's Jan 20 2026 ruling is listed by NJ among decisions for the States and, per Williams, assumed swaps without deciding.
- A state high court is not bound by Flaherty; Assad, Blue Lake and the Sixth Circuit motions panel supply persuasive reasoning against Kalshi.
- Finality: an interlocutory injunction ruling is not a final state-court judgment, so direct cert from the SJC is unlikely; its main value is as split evidence and momentum.
- whether the SJC decides the swap question or assumes it as the Superior Court did; the posture of SJC-13906 is not confirmed in the files.
What would change it
- An SJC opinion holding sports contracts are swaps: cuts Commonwealth odds to about 45%.
- A US/CFTC amicus filing or a Massachusetts final CFTC rule: little effect on direction, may delay decision.
- Decision date after Dec 31 2026: suggests a divided court and lifts Kalshi odds a few points.
Ninth Circuit, Blue Lake
What happens next in Blue Lake (remand on remaining injunction factors, en banc petition, cert petition)
52% About evenrange 40–64 · medium confidence
Kalshi seeks rehearing and pairs Blue Lake with the New Jersey cert petition; the panel opinion stays intact (no vacatur) and the district court enters a preliminary injunction, contested or stipulated, restricting sports event contracts for users located on the Tribes' lands by 30 June 2027.
Timing. Rehearing petition in early Oct 2026 (assumption on ordinary appellate timing, not in the documents); rehearing ruling by Dec 2026; remand ruling on the Winter factors in Q1-Q2 2027; any Blue Lake cert petition follows rehearing disposition.
What drives it, and what would change it
Drivers
- Sub-forecasts: Kalshi seeks panel or en banc rehearing 75%; en banc granted 8%; Kalshi files a Blue Lake cert petition by 30 June 2027 40%; Supreme Court grants the New Jersey petition by Jan 2027 about 60%.
- The panel already found likelihood of success, 'the most important Winter factor', and remanded only for the rest. Assad's findings that geofencing costs are unlikely to be too expensive and that Kalshi's harms are self-inflicted favor the Tribes on equities.
- The district court's denial rested on law (no binding instrument, no location on Indian lands, UIGEA, CEA), so no Winter findings exist and a fresh record on irreparable harm decides the timing.
- The alternative holding (Tribes win even if the contracts are swaps) insulates Blue Lake from a swap ruling unless the Supreme Court also holds that the CEA displaces IGRA.
- The opinion is by Judge McKeown with no separate opinion in the file, and rests on Assad, Bay Mills and Curran; that lowers en banc odds but not Kalshi's incentive to petition.
What would change it
- An en banc order vacating the opinion would cut the headline probability below 15%.
- A Supreme Court grant in the New Jersey matter followed by a stay or hold of Blue Lake remand proceedings would push the injunction past mid-2027.
- Voluntary geofencing of tribal lands or a stipulated order with the Tribes raises 'restriction in place' odds and lowers 'contested injunction' odds.
Other tribes
Likelihood other tribes obtain injunctions against event contracts on tribal land in the next 12 months, and what Kalshi and others change in product or geofencing strategy
50% About evenrange 35–65 · low confidence
At least one more federally recognized tribe (beyond Blue Lake and Chicken Ranch) obtains a court order, contested or stipulated, restricting Kalshi or Robinhood sports event contracts for users on its lands by 21 Sep 2027, with nearly all such orders coming from Ninth Circuit district courts.
Timing. New filings Q4 2026; preliminary injunction rulings Q1-Q3 2027; Ninth Circuit district courts follow published Blue Lake authority absent vacatur, while courts elsewhere treat it as persuasive only.
What drives it, and what would change it
Drivers
- Sub-forecasts: another tribe files an IGRA suit against Kalshi or a distributor within 12 months 70%; a court outside the Ninth Circuit grants a tribal-lands injunction 12%; Kalshi voluntarily geofences all tribal lands 25%.
- The cause of action is instrument-specific: the panel's closed system needs an ordinance barring unauthorized gaming plus procedures or a compact that make ordinance compliance a term. Tribes under similar California procedures are the closest matches.
- Kalshi lost the geofencing-cost argument in Assad and resisted geofencing in Nevada; a tribal-land geofence is far smaller than a state geofence, which lowers its incentive to litigate each tribal case.
- Rehearing (en banc grant 8%) and Supreme Court action on the New Jersey petition (grant about 60%) delay filings and rulings, cutting timing more than direction.
- Assad's footnote records the Arizona appeal (Johnson, No. 26-2978) docketed in the Ninth Circuit on May 11, 2026; a ruling applying Assad would extend the likely-not-swaps premise across that state.
What would change it
- En banc vacatur, or a Supreme Court ruling that sports event contracts are swaps and that CEA exclusivity displaces IGRA, would drop the probability below 20%.
- A Blue Lake remand injunction with a workable geofence order would raise follow-on filings and stipulations.
- Supreme Court denial of the New Jersey petition, leaving the split in place, would modestly raise the probability by strengthening Kalshi's incentive to settle tribal claims.
United States v. New York
Will the S.D.N.Y. grant the United States or CFTC declaratory or injunctive relief on preemption of New York gambling law as applied to DCM event contracts by Dec 31, 2026?
10% Unlikelyrange 4–18 · low confidence
No ruling for the federal plaintiffs by year-end. The merits are more likely decided in 2027, with a Second Circuit appeal either way.
Timing. Merits ruling more likely in 2027; any interim step is a briefing or scheduling order.
What drives it, and what would change it
Drivers
- Complaint filed Apr 24, 2026 seeking only final relief; the documents show no schedule or response.
- Parallel cases: Kalshi v. Williams (No. 1:25-cv-08846-AT) and New York v. Kalshi (removed, No. 1:26-cv-06550) may be coordinated.
- A live circuit conflict (Third for Kalshi, Ninth against) makes a fast district-level ruling less likely.
- The Second Circuit's view is not in the documents.
What would change it
- A Second Circuit ruling in Kalshi v. Williams.
- A motion for preliminary relief by the United States.
- A final 40.11 rule that removes the 'shall not' issue.
CFTC rulemaking
Will the CFTC finalize the public-interest rule this year, and in what form (does it define sports contracts as contrary to public interest or not)?
50% About evenrange 35–65 · low confidence
Commission approves a final Part 40 rule by Dec 31, 2026 that keeps sports eligible: 'gaming' means games (sports included), 'may determine' replaces 'shall not', aggregate pro and college outcomes weigh against a contrary finding, prop categories are likely contrary. No per se sports bar.
Timing. Approval most likely Nov-Dec 2026; effective 60 days after Federal Register publication, so early 2027 even if approved in Q4.
What drives it, and what would change it
Drivers
- Pace: 90 days from ANPRM approval (Mar 12) to NPRM (Jun 10); the Commission also acted within 10 days on the emergency order.
- Urgency: the Ninth Circuit (Aug 28) said unamended 40.11(a) controls; only a final rule removes that premise.
- Single voter: the voting summaries list only Chairman Selig voting, so no documented dissent.
- Drag: about 3,500 ANPRM comments, more on the NPRM, OMB review, cost-benefit and reasoned-change duties.
- If finalized, my conditional odds: sports (aggregate outcomes) not deemed contrary 95%; gaming includes sports 90%; prop categories kept as likely contrary 85%.
What would change it
- Federal Register publication date and comment close (not in the documents).
- OMB submission or a public timetable from the Chairman.
- A Second Circuit or Supreme Court ruling that alters the agency's litigation posture.
CFTC emergency orders
Will the CFTC issue at least one more CEA 8a(9) emergency order or comparable directive shielding a DCM from a state enforcement action between Sept 22 and Dec 31, 2026?
55% About evenrange 35–72 · low confidence
Yes, at least one more. Trigger is a new state TRO or enforcement step, with Kalshi or another DCM notifying the Commission first.
Timing. Within roughly 2 to 3 weeks of a new state TRO motion; the Aug 1 to Aug 11 gap was 10 days.
What drives it, and what would change it
Drivers
- Two such orders in 28 days (Jul 14 Michigan, Aug 11 New York) are documented.
- The Aug 28 Ninth Circuit ruling raises the chance of Nevada enforcement against a DCM, which invites the same notice-and-order sequence.
- New York sued Coinbase (an FCM) and Gemini (a DCM) on Apr 21, so more registrants face state action.
- The Commission signed 'existential threat' findings, so repeat use costs little.
What would change it
- A court of appeals stay or vacatur of the Aug 11 order (my estimate 4% by year-end).
- A final 40.11 rule that moves the fight into ordinary preemption litigation.
- A settlement with New York, or DCMs choosing not to file notices.
Congress
Will Congress enact a statute by Dec 31, 2026 that resolves who regulates sports event contracts (express preemption or a ban on DCM sports or election contracts), and will any state enact a statute aimed at prediction markets?
3% Unlikelyrange 1–6 · medium confidence
No federal statute by year-end. The documents cite no pending bill, only an Apr 30, 2026 letter from eight Senators (incl. Merkley) urging categorical prohibition of election, war, terrorism and sports contracts. State statute: 25% for at least one new event-contract statute (my base-rate estimate, not in documents).
Timing. Federal enactment in 2026 is close to nil; the earliest realistic vehicle is a 2027 bill after the circuit split matures.
What drives it, and what would change it
Drivers
- Assad states 'Congress can regulate sports gambling directly' (Murphy) but 'has not done so'.
- A circuit split (Third vs Ninth) and the New York fight raise pressure, yet no bill appears in the documents.
- The agency chose rulemaking, litigation and orders, which reduces the pressure on Congress to act.
- State action so far is enforcement and litigation (NY, NV, NJ, MI), and one NY executive order (Apr 22), not statutes.
What would change it
- A bill with committee markup or leadership backing.
- A Supreme Court grant or a rule that leaves states with no path.
- A state legislature passing a licensing or ban statute.
Where the courts that reached the question landed
Each court is grouped by its answer to each question. “Not decided” includes a court that assumed the point without deciding it.
Question 1Do the CEA and CFTC authority displace state gambling law for sports event contracts?
Yes2
Third Circuit, Flaherty
Apr. 6, 2026 · Preliminary injunction affirmed
Kalshi has a reasonable chance of success on preemption
D. Minn.
July 27, 2026 · Preliminary injunctions granted (criminal statute)
In many respects
No3
Ninth Circuit, Assad
Aug. 28, 2026 · Dissolution of injunction affirmed in part
Kalshi did not show preemption is likely
Ninth Circuit, Blue Lake
Sept. 16, 2026 · Preliminary-injunction ruling
The CEA does not displace the tribes’ IGRA claim
S.D.N.Y., Williams
July 7, 2026 · Preliminary injunction denied
New York law is not preempted
Not decided1
Sixth Circuit, Schuler
Apr. 24, 2026 · Motions panel; unpublished; injunction pending appeal denied
Arguments “largely in equipoise (if not favoring Ohio)”
Question 2Are the sports contracts “swaps”?
Yes1
Third Circuit, Flaherty
Apr. 6, 2026 · Preliminary injunction affirmed
The court so held.
Partly1
D. Minn.
July 27, 2026 · Preliminary injunctions granted (criminal statute)
Some contracts, not all
No1
Ninth Circuit, Assad
Aug. 28, 2026 · Dissolution of injunction affirmed in part
Likely not
Not decided3
Ninth Circuit, Blue Lake
Sept. 16, 2026 · Preliminary-injunction ruling
Not decided; relies on Assad
Sixth Circuit, Schuler
Apr. 24, 2026 · Motions panel; unpublished; injunction pending appeal denied
Assumed, not decided
S.D.N.Y., Williams
July 7, 2026 · Preliminary injunction denied
Assumed, not decided
The timeline
Each mark is one entry below; select it to jump there. Position is the date; the row is the kind of body.
As of Sept. 16, 2026
6 for prediction markets (Kalshi)6 against, for the states1 against, for the tribes1 mixed
- 9th Cir.: The Ninth Circuit holds two tribes likely to succeed under IGRA against Kalshi’s sports contracts on tribal land.The Tribes won.
- 9th Cir.: The Ninth Circuit holds Nevada’s law likely survives: sports event contracts are likely not swaps.Nevada won.
- E.D. Wis.: A Wisconsin federal court denies the federal government’s preliminary injunction.Wisconsin won.
- Favors Kalshi (federal preemption)
- Favors the state
- Favors the tribes
- Mixed
- Agency or legislative action
- Pending
Entries in date order
How each entry is known: “Read at the source” means the court’s or agency’s own document was read. Other entries say how they are known, in words, beside the date.
Sept 2026
9th Cir.Favors the tribesRead at the source
The Ninth Circuit holds two tribes likely to succeed under IGRA against Kalshi’s sports contracts on tribal land.
Blue Lake Rancheria v. Kalshi, Inc., No. 25-7504
A panel (Murguia, McKeown, Paez; opinion by McKeown; argued July 10) reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction in part and remanded for the remaining injunction factors. It affirmed the refusal to enjoin Kalshi’s advertisement on the Lanham Act claim, because a lay opinion about legality is not actionable.
Who wonThe Tribes (except the advertising claim)against Kalshi
Why
- The contracts are class III gaming under IGRA. The test is functional: what the activity looks like, not what the operator calls it.
- They are “located on Indian lands” because users enter them from tribal territory.
- They violate the tribes’ secretarial procedures, which allow class III gaming only when tribally authorized. IGRA is not displaced by the federal internet-gambling statute.
- Kalshi won the Lanham Act claim over its advertisement: a lay opinion about legality is not actionable.
The analysis is functional.1 IGRA does not ask whether the operator labels the product a bet or an event contract, or something else.2 It asks what the activity looks like.3 This inquiry reflects the maxim that the words of a statute should carry "their ordinary meaning."
- 1The test the panel applies to the product.
- 2Renaming or restructuring the product does not change the answer under IGRA.
- 3The same substance-over-label reasoning the Ninth Circuit used in Assad.
Tribes’s case
- Text: 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) limits who may sue (tribes, states) and what may be enjoined (class III gaming activity) but not who may be enjoined. The object of the injunction is the activity, so Kalshi need not be a party to any compact or procedure.
- Function over label: IGRA asks what the activity looks like. Consideration, an uncertain outcome and a prize are all present, NIGC's rule lists sports betting as class III, and Assad already found the substance of these contracts is sports gambling.
- Location: a contract is 'located on Indian lands' when the user enters it from tribal territory. Iipay put the gaming at the place of the wager, and Bay Mills says class III gaming is what goes on at the casino, not off-site operation, so Kalshi's New York infrastructure does not matter.
- Closed system: IGRA requires an NIGC-approved ordinance before a compacted or secretarially approved regime takes effect. The ordinances bar all gaming not expressly authorized and the procedures require ordinance compliance and tribal ownership, so unauthorized class III gaming violates the procedures.
Kalshi’s case
- Privity: a compact or secretarial procedure is a contract binding only its parties. Kalshi signed nothing, and 2710(d)(7)(A)(iii) hands enforcement of procedures to the Secretary. The panel rejected this, but it remains Kalshi's cleanest textual argument for rehearing or certiorari.
- Text gap: (A)(ii) covers gaming in violation of a 'Tribal-State compact entered into under paragraph (3)'; secretarial procedures arise under (B)(vii) and are named only in (A)(iii). The panel bridged the gap with Stand Up's 'functionally equivalent' language rather than with the statutory text.
- Topics: a compact may cover only listed subjects ('may' means 'may only', per Chicken Ranch), so instruments cannot regulate third parties. The panel conceded some topics may be off limits yet called the point beside the point, which leaves a preserved objection about where the line sits.
U.S. Supreme CourtPendingRead at the source
New Jersey asks the Supreme Court to review the Third Circuit’s decision; the petition is docketed as No. 26-299.
Flaherty v. KalshiEX, LLC (petition for certiorari)
The petition presents one question: whether the Dodd-Frank Act preempted state regulation of sports bets offered on CFTC-registered markets. The Court docketed it on Sept. 8 as No. 26-299 (linked to the application, No. 25A1465). Kalshi’s response was due Oct. 8, and on Sept. 18 Kalshi moved for an extension of time; the docket does not show the motion decided. What the petition says is a party’s argument, not a holding.
That acknowledged split is driven by a conflict over the interpretation of the word swap in Dodd-Frank.1
- 1New Jersey's framing of the split: it turns on what "swap" means. This is a party's argument, not a holding.
Aug 2026
9th Cir.Favors the stateRead at the source
The Ninth Circuit holds Nevada’s law likely survives: sports event contracts are likely not swaps.
KalshiEX, LLC v. Assad, No. 25-7516
A panel (R. Nelson, Bade, Lee; Lee concurring) affirmed in part the dissolution of Kalshi’s injunction as to sports contracts and remanded on election contracts. It agreed with the Third Circuit that the CEA occupies the field of swaps traded on a designated contract market, and disagreed that sports contracts are swaps.
Who wonNevada (sports contracts)against Kalshi
Why
- Kalshi did not show a likelihood that the Act preempts Nevada’s gaming rules as applied to its sports contracts, so dissolving the injunction was within the district court’s discretion.
- The panel agreed with the Third Circuit that the Act occupies the field of swaps traded on a designated contract market.
- But sports event contracts are likely not swaps. The substance is sports gambling, whatever Kalshi calls it.
- Kalshi keeps a remand on its election contracts.
Rather, everyone, including Kalshi, knows it when they see it. The substance of the sports event contracts offered on Kalshi's DCM is sports gambling, regardless of whether Kalshi calls them swaps.1 Just as "[t]hat which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet, " WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2, placing sports bets, even when called by another name, is still gambling.
- 1A functional test that looks past the label. Blue Lake applies the same reasoning under IGRA.
Kalshi’s case
- §2(a)(1)(A) preempts state law for swaps on a DCM, and sports contracts fit §1a(47)(A)(ii) on Kalshi's dictionaries ('a thing that happens', 'the outcome, issue, or result of anything'); the court concedes the broad reading has 'cursory plain-language appeal'.
- The Special Rule is 'irrefutable textual proof' that Congress put the public-interest gaming decision with the CFTC, not 50 states; the CFTC, as amicus, argued §40.11 does not bar sports contracts.
- Nevada cannot decide swap status without an APA challenge to CFTC action (Big Lagoon); rejected because Nevada attacks no CFTC action and Kalshi invoked the CEA 'as a sword'.
State’s case
- 'Event' as a synonym for outcome is 'archaic or rare'; 'associated with' means inherently connected, read with the other financial subparts (noscitur); no limiting principle because §2(e) would make off-DCM sports bets CEA violations; Kalshi itself lists table-tennis contracts.
- Elephant-in-a-mousehole and major questions: Congress addressed gambling in PASPA, IGRA and the Wire Act; a Wall Street reform bill did not hand the CFTC national gambling regulation. Judge Lee's concurrence agrees.
- §40.11(a) 'shall not' bars listing contracts that involve gaming; the CFTC never invoked §40.11(c) review; the court gives no deference to the CFTC's reading; proposed rules 'have no legal effect'.
New York City CouncilAgency or legislative actionRead at the source
The New York City Council opens an inquiry into prediction-market marketing, especially to young people.
Inquiry into prediction-market marketing
Letters went to Kalshi, Polymarket, Coinbase and Gemini Titan. The press release states no question count, deadline or hearing date, and this entry states none.
CFTCAgency or legislative actionRead at the source
The CFTC orders Kalshi to keep operating as an exchange after New York’s suit.
In the Matter of KalshiEX LLC’s Notice Regarding Market Emergency Declaration
Under CEA § 8a(9), the Commission found New York’s suit and its request for a restraining order to be a “major market disturbance” and ordered Kalshi to continue its exchange functions. The order says review lies only in a court of appeals.
Put simply, New York's lawsuit threatens to prevent a CFTC-registered DCM from offering event contracts to anyone in the world.1 That unprecedented assertion of state authority cuts at the very heart of the Commission's jurisdiction and would have significant adverse ramifications for national and international financial markets. If New York's lawsuit, with the extreme relief it seeks, is permitted to continue, then a single State will effectively become the nationwide regulator of event-contract swaps on DCMs.2 That is the antithesis of the structure that Congress designed for federal derivatives regulation.
- 1The agency's stated stake is the reach of the relief New York seeks, not sports contracts, which the order never mentions.
- 2The federal position in one sentence: exclusive jurisdiction recast as an emergency.
Government’s case
- It gives Kalshi a federal directive to keep operating. A state TRO shutting the exchange would conflict with a Commission order, which supports impossibility preemption. The order says a DCM 'cannot be shut down by a single State'.
- Findings tie the emergency to Core Principles 4 and 9: a state ban adds a 'risk premium', creates arbitrage between New York and other DCMs, and forces liquidations that distort prices. That is a market-integrity frame separate from the swap definition.
State’s case
- The order acts before any TRO. It concedes the case 'has been removed to federal court and may be delayed by remand proceedings', so a state can say no market disturbance had occurred.
- The quoted text of 8a(9) speaks of 'any futures contract', while the order says Kalshi lists its contracts as swaps. A state can argue the emergency power does not reach a swaps exchange.
July 2026
N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. CountyFavors the stateRead at the source
The New York Attorney General sues Kalshi for illegal unlicensed gambling.
People v. KalshiEX LLC, Index No. 453272/2026
The verified petition under Executive Law § 63(12) invokes N.Y. Const. art. I, § 9, Penal Law §§ 225.05, 225.10 and 225.20, Racing Law §§ 1367 and 1367-a, and the Wire Act, and seeks an injunction, restitution, disgorgement and penalties. It was removed to the Southern District the same day (No. 1:26-cv-06550); a motion to remand was fully briefed on Aug. 28.
Respondent has reported a $22 billion valuation of its gambling business and an annualized transaction volume of $178 billion, but Respondent seeks to avoid the legal and financial consequences of New York's close regulation of gambling by offering what is quintessentially wagering under the guise of "event contracts" on a "prediction market."1
- 1The State's frame is substance over label. The Ninth Circuit adopted the same frame in Assad and Blue Lake.
Kalshi’s case
- The CFTC order says Kalshi lists event contracts as swaps under exclusive CFTC jurisdiction; Flaherty (3d Cir.) and the CFTC's own suits support preemption; the CFTC issued a §8a(9) emergency order on Aug 11 directing Kalshi to keep operating.
- Per the CFTC order, the action was removed to S.D.N.Y. (No. 1:26-cv-06550) on July 31; the State's TRO would reach contracts 'within or from New York' and Kalshi is headquartered in New York, so a single State would become the national regulator of event-contract swaps.
- Kalshi's better-supported arguments are procedural (federal forum, first-filed preemption record, Williams appeal pending) rather than merits: Williams, Assad and the Sixth Circuit order all weigh against preemption of sports betting law.
State’s case
- Each contract 'is a bet' under Penal Law §225.00(2): a New York account holder bought four 'Yes' wagers at $0.285 (fee $0.06), and Kalshi charges a fee per wager; Kalshi is unlicensed, allows ages 18-20, and offered wagers on Siena-Duke and Hofstra-Alabama.
- The petition pleads eight Executive Law §63(12) causes: N.Y. Const. art. I §9, Penal Law §§225.05, 225.10, 225.20, Racing Law §§1367(16)(a), 1367-a(2)(a), 1367-a(4)(b) and the federal Wire Act; remedies include restitution, disgorgement, treble-gain penalties and $100,000 per offer.
- Harm evidence: ages 18-24 are high risk, mobile sports betting has passed casinos as the top helpline reason, NY licensed operators pay about 51% tax and follow responsible-gaming rules that Kalshi avoids; Kalshi advertised 'legal in all 50 states'.
6th Cir.PendingDocket read; reasoning not read
The Sixth Circuit merits panel hears argument.
KalshiEX LLC v. Schuler, No. 26-3196 (consolidated with No. 26-5235)
The panel is Judges Clay, Gibbons and Bloomekatz. No. 26-5235, argued the same morning, is Tennessee’s appeal from the Orgel injunction; the court consolidated the two for submission on June 17. Dozens of tribes, the American Gaming Association, forty states and the District of Columbia, and the CFTC filed amicus briefs. The docket showed no decision as of Sept. 8.
E.D. Wis.Favors the stateDocket read; reasoning not read
A Wisconsin federal court denies the federal government’s preliminary injunction.
United States v. State of Wisconsin, No. 2:26-cv-00749 (Griesbach, J.), ECF 54
The order was signed July 28 and docketed July 29. The case was stayed and administratively closed on Sept. 8 pending Seventh Circuit appeals (Nos. 26-2675 and 26-2696). The court’s reasoning was not read; press reports say it doubted the swap theory.
Who wonWisconsinagainst the United States
Why
- Press reports say the court doubted the swap theory. The opinion was not read.
The opinion itself was not read for this entry. The winner is known from a later opinion, a docket or a report.
D. Minn.Favors Kalshi (federal preemption)Read at the source
A Minnesota federal court enjoins the state’s criminal prediction-market statute as applied to CFTC-registered exchanges.
United States and CFTC v. Minnesota, No. 26-cv-2661 (with KalshiEX v. Ellison and QCX v. Ellison)
Judge Menendez found express preemption likely “in many respects” and that some of the contracts fit the swap definition, and cautioned that the statute is not preempted in every respect. The injunctions cover Minn. Stat. § 609.7615.
Who wonThe exchanges and the United States (in part)against Minnesota
Why
- Express preemption is likely “in many respects”, and some of the contracts fit the swap definition.
- The court found the United States and the CFTC likely to show injury, and so had standing to sue.
- It cautioned that both sides had treated the case as all-or-nothing, and that the statute is not preempted in every respect.
However, one is hard pressed to imagine the financial, economic, or commercial consequence of the occurrence or outcome of these events unless the words of limitation in 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(ii) are stretched so broadly that they impose no limit on the CFTC's jurisdiction at all. Regrettably, although the briefing from all parties here is excellent, both sides have treated the issues before the Court as all-or-nothing propositions1—either the CEA preempts any enforcement of the Minnesota law or it doesn't.
- 1The court declines both blanket positions. Contracts are sorted one by one, which is why the sports-betting question was left open.
Kalshi’s case
- Kalshi, Polymarket US and the United States/CFTC argued express preemption through exclusive jurisdiction over swaps, the broad swap definition, the Special Rule and recent case law; they also argued field and conflict preemption and, for the DCMs, the First Amendment (not reached).
- The CFTC showed injury through the Beale declaration (staff resources diverted to DCM guidance after state-law compliance orders); irreparable harm included felony exposure, more than 90,000 Minnesota users and unrecoverable liability given sovereign immunity.
State’s case
- The CFTC lacks standing (no concrete harm to agency operations or direct violation of federal law); the heightened 'likely to prevail' standard applies to enjoining a statute; the CFTC accepted a Salerno facial standard.
- Swaps should be limited to commodity-linked contracts; Kalshi's reading violates noscitur and surplusage; swaps entered the CFTC's remit after the 2008 crisis, not to cover gambling.
- Minnesota's stated concerns: lawmakers saw event contracts as indistinguishable from gambling, with risks of manipulation and problem gambling among young people; the State did not disavow enforcement.
Order (filed copy hosted by Courthouse News) (opens in a new tab)
S.D.N.Y.Favors the stateRead at the source
The Southern District of New York denies Kalshi a preliminary injunction: New York gambling law is not preempted.
KalshiEX LLC v. Williams, No. 1:25-cv-08846-AT (Torres, J.), ECF 106
Judge Torres assumed without deciding that the contracts are swaps and held that New York’s gambling laws are not preempted expressly, by field or by conflict. Kalshi appealed the same day (No. 26-1835). A Rule 60(a) order of July 13 (ECF 109) corrected a scrivener’s error on page 18; later opinions cite the corrected version.
Who wonNew Yorkagainst Kalshi
Why
- The court assumed without deciding that the contracts are swaps.
- Even so, New York’s gambling laws are not preempted expressly, by field or by conflict.
- The Act’s text preserves state laws on whether particular conduct is lawful or unlawful.
That is, the Special Rule's "plain text clearly reflects an affirmative intent to preserve state laws governing whether particular conduct is lawful or unlawful.1"
- 1The court reads the CEA's own Special Rule as preserving state law on whether conduct is lawful. That holding does not depend on the swap question, which the court assumed for Kalshi without deciding.
Kalshi’s case
- CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over swaps on DCMs; Kalshi is a DCM that self-certified; the Special Rule shows Congress left the public-interest gaming decision to the CFTC, which has not acted.
- Express, field and conflict preemption all apply; impartial access (17 C.F.R. §38.151(b)) makes compliance with state licensing impossible for a nationwide DCM; state enforcement defeats uniform regulation.
- Irreparable harm: civil and criminal exposure, state-by-state geolocation cost, reputational harm and possible loss of DCM status; the parties agreed no evidentiary hearing was needed.
State’s case
- The presumption against preemption applies (gambling is a state police power); §2(a)(1)(A)'s savings clause; §16(e) and §16(h) show Congress preempted state gaming law only in enumerated settings; the Special Rule contemplates a state-law overlay (Martin).
- Impartial access is an anti-discrimination rule, and Kalshi can obtain a New York license and create a New York participant category; self-certification 'is not tantamount to a declaration that the contract is lawful'; Sen. Lincoln's remarks.
- The Gaming Commission is an arm of the State (Eleventh Amendment); Kalshi did not respond, and the Commission was dismissed.
Opinion and order (hosted by the New York Attorney General) (opens in a new tab)
June 2026
CFTCAgency or legislative actionRead at the source
The CFTC proposes factors for when sports event contracts are contrary to the public interest.
Prediction Markets; Public Interest Determinations (RIN 3038-AF65)
The proposal amends 17 C.F.R. § 40.11 and adds an Appendix F to Part 40. The Ninth Circuit’s Assad decision rests in part on § 40.11. The comment deadline is reported as July 27, 2026; the pre-publication text says forty-five days after publication.
The breadth of potential outcomes, and the variety of factors influencing the outcomes, should provide more opportunities for the event contracts to advance price discovery or provide meaningful information. Generally, a finding that sports-related event contracts fall within the above categories would weigh heavily against finding that the contract is contrary to the public1 interest.
- 1The proposal leans toward permitting sports contracts that settle on aggregate outcomes, while its definition of "gaming" captures professional sports. The two together are what the states and the Ninth Circuit read differently.
Government’s case
- It repudiates the per se reading: 40.11 is 'a discretionary review framework rather than a self-executing per se prohibition'. If finalized, the Ninth Circuit premise that 40.11(a) bars gaming listings falls away.
- Preliminary view: aggregate outcomes of professional or collegiate games (final scores, point differentials, win-loss, advancement, statistical performance) with objective settlement, integrity framework and surveillance are 'unlikely' to be contrary to the public interest.
State’s case
- It defines 'gaming' to capture professional sports and to include all sports, placing sports contracts inside the Special Rule. That matches the Ninth Circuit view that sports contracts involve gaming.
- A proposal has no legal effect. Assad (Aug 28) says that until 40.11(a) is amended 'it bars Kalshi's gaming-related contracts', and Judge Lee says current 40.11 'controls the outcome'. Any final rule takes effect 60 days after publication.
CFTC, proposed rule (pre-publication text) (opens in a new tab)
May 2026
D. Ariz.Favors Kalshi (federal preemption)Taken from a later opinion that cites it
An Arizona federal court rules for Kalshi.
KalshiEX v. Johnson (preliminary injunction)
The appeal is No. 26-2978 in the Ninth Circuit. The date is taken from later opinions that cite the ruling.
Who wonKalshiagainst Arizona
The opinion itself was not read for this entry. The winner is known from a later opinion, a docket or a report, and the reasons are not stated here.
Apr 2026
S.D.N.Y.Agency or legislative actionRead at the source
The United States and the CFTC sue New York for a declaration that federal authority is exclusive.
United States and CFTC v. State of New York, No. 1:26-cv-03404
The complaint seeks a declaration of exclusive CFTC jurisdiction over event contracts and an injunction against enforcing preempted state law. No ruling was found as of Sept. 21.
Offering event contracts on a DCM cannot, in and of itself, be an activity that is unlawful under any state law1 because such an application of state law would conflict with the CEA. "Congress's intent was to provide the CFTC with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate commodities" and "[s]uch exclusive jurisdiction precludes states from exercising supplementary regulatory authority over commodity transactions."
- 1The federal government's central merits claim. It assumes the contracts are swaps, the point the Ninth Circuit decided the other way in Assad.
Government’s case
- The United States and CFTC allege that event contracts listed on DCMs are a type of 'swap' (Compl. ¶35), that §2(a)(1)(A) preempts NY Racing Law §1367 and Penal Law §225 as applied to DCM transactions, and that the Special Rule shows Congress placed event contracts within CFTC purview (¶54).
- The complaint invokes field, express (§§2(a)(1)(A), 16(e)), impossibility (impartial access, ¶78) and obstacle preemption, and pleads irreparable harm to the CFTC's exclusive authority and resources; it relies on Flaherty (¶81).
- CEA 2(a)(1)(A) gives the CFTC 'exclusive jurisdiction' over swaps and futures on DCMs. The complaint walks the 1974, 1978, 1982, 1992, 2000 and 2010 amendments to support express, field and obstacle preemption (paras 44-52, 71-79).
State’s case
- The complaint treats all DCM event contracts as swaps, a position that Assad rejects for sports contracts and that D. Minn. accepts only for contracts with real economic linkage.
- New York's defenses track Williams: presumption against preemption, savings clause, §16(e)/(h) as limited preemption, Special Rule preserving state law, impartial access as anti-discrimination, and standing challenges to the CFTC's injury (as in Minnesota). New York's actual briefing in this case is not in the documents.
- Ninth Circuit (Assad, Aug 28) found Kalshi unlikely to show preemption, reasoning sports contracts are not 'swaps' but sports bets, and that 40.11(a) bars gaming listings. That directly conflicts with Flaherty; the Second Circuit position is not in the documents.
6th Cir.MixedRead at the source
A Sixth Circuit motions panel denies Kalshi an injunction pending appeal and expedites the appeal.
KalshiEX LLC v. Schuler, No. 26-3196
The unpublished per curiam order (Batchelder, Murphy, Ritz) assumed without deciding that the contracts are swaps. It is an order on a motion, not a merits decision.
Who wonOhio (on the motion only)against Kalshi
Why
- The panel found the preemption arguments “largely in equipoise (if not favoring Ohio)”, and denied an injunction pending appeal.
- It assumed without deciding that the contracts are swaps.
- It expedited the appeal. The merits are undecided.
This split of authorities leaves no doubt that Kalshi has raised serious questions on the merits. At least at this stage, though, we find the preemption arguments largely in equipoise (if not favoring Ohio).1 Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law overcomes state law whenever the two collide.
- 1The motions panel's read at an early stage. It is an order on a motion, not a merits decision; the merits panel heard argument July 30.
Kalshi’s case
- The Third Circuit and M.D. Tenn. ruled for Kalshi, so the merits are contested; Kalshi argued express, field and conflict preemption, including impossibility via 'impartial access' versus Ohio's physical-presence rule.
- Kalshi argued irreparable harm from expensive geofencing that it likely cannot recover from Ohio, and sought an injunction pending appeal.
State’s case
- 'Exclusive jurisdiction' identifies the governing agency, not the governing law; it is unusual as an express-preemption clause because typical clauses say 'preempt' or 'supersede'.
- Two savings clauses plus §16(e)(1), §13a-2(1) and §13a-2(7) show Congress left room for state regulation; §16(e)(2) and §16(h) preempt only listed categories.
- Ohio regulates sports betting, not futures trading, so the presumption against preemption applies; uniformity is 'not to be accomplished at all costs'.
The filed copy is a scanned image; the quotation was read from it by optical character recognition.
3d Cir.Favors Kalshi (federal preemption)Read at the source
The Third Circuit affirms Kalshi’s preliminary injunction against New Jersey, 2–1.
KalshiEX LLC v. Flaherty, No. 25-1922, 172 F.4th 220
The majority (Porter, joined by Chagares; Roth dissenting) held Kalshi has a reasonable chance of success on its argument that the CEA preempts New Jersey’s gambling laws as applied to sports event contracts on a designated contract market. It is a preliminary-stage ruling, not a final judgment.
Who wonKalshi (2–1)against New Jersey
Why
- The contracts are swaps traded on a CFTC-licensed exchange, so the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over them.
- The Act preempts state laws that directly interfere with swaps traded on those exchanges.
- New Jersey framed the case as regulation of all sports gambling. The court framed it as regulation of trading on federally designated markets.
The parties contest whether the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction over DCMs as conferred by the Act preempts New Jersey gambling laws and the state constitution's prohibition on collegiate sports betting. New Jersey frames the issue broadly (regulating all sports gambling) rather than narrowly (regulating trading on federally designated contract markets).2 The text of the Act suggests that the narrow framing is the better reading. The Act preempts state laws that directly interfere with swaps traded on DCMs.1 Kalshi's sports-related event contracts are swaps traded on a CFTC-licensed DCM, so the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction.
- 1The premise the Third and Ninth Circuits share: exclusive federal jurisdiction over swaps on a designated contract market. Assad later says it agrees with this conclusion.
- 2The framing that decided the case. The court treated the state law as a regulation of trading on a federal market, not of sports gambling generally.
Kalshi’s case
- Text route. §2(a)(1)(A) gives the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over swaps traded on a DCM; §1a(47)(A)(ii) reaches events 'associated with' a 'potential' consequence, and the district court found affected sponsors, advertisers, networks, franchises and communities. Majority: 'The analysis need not go further.'
- Narrow field framing. Preemption covers only regulation of trading on a DCM, not gambling generally; Kalshi disclaims any claim to preempt off-DCM or casino betting (n.2), and §16(e)(1)(B)(i) preserves state law only for transactions off registered entities, confirming the on-DCM boundary.
- Conflict route. Applying NJ law would bar a licensed DCM from listing contracts in NJ and recreate the state-by-state patchwork Congress replaced in 1974; Am. Agric. Movement (7th Cir.) treats laws that directly affect trading as preempted.
State’s case
- The relevant field is gambling, traditionally state-regulated; the presumption against preemption applies with special force; DCM trading is a subfield of futures trading, and federal occupation of a subfield cannot oust state gambling law.
- The two savings clauses are 'fundamentally incompatible with complete field preemption'; §16(e)(2) preempts state gaming law only for enumerated exempt or excluded transactions, and DCM trading is not on that list.
- §40.11(a)(1) already bars DCMs from listing gaming contracts, so state gambling law complements the Act; Sen. Lincoln's colloquy says Super Bowl or Masters contracts 'would be used solely for gambling'; agency inaction cannot preempt.
Mar 2026
CFTCAgency or legislative actionRead at the source
The CFTC opens a rulemaking on prediction markets with forty questions.
Prediction Markets, advance notice of proposed rulemaking (RIN 3038-AF65)
Published at 91 Fed. Reg. 12516 (Mar. 16, 2026). Comments closed April 30, 2026.
Government’s case
- The notice describes event contracts as swaps or futures under CFTC 'exclusive jurisdiction' (n.5) and asks how federal core principles apply (Q1-Q6). It never asks whether states may regulate these contracts, which fits the federal-exclusivity premise.
- It says the 2024 proposal was withdrawn to reconsider it 'in light of various forms of state regulatory actions and litigation concerning the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction', tying the agency's own rulemaking to defending that jurisdiction.
State’s case
- Q19 asks whether 'gaming' is synonymous with, or broader than, State and Federal gambling statutes, and Q19(b) whether a sports competition differs from an award contest. As of Mar 2026 the agency had not decided that sports contracts fall outside gaming.
- Q16 lists 'activity that is unlawful under any Federal or State law' as an enumerated activity and asks how to treat activity unlawful in some States but not others. State law is an input to the federal public-interest test.
Feb 2026
M.D. Tenn.Favors Kalshi (federal preemption)Taken from a later opinion that cites it
A Tennessee federal court rules for Kalshi.
KalshiEX v. Orgel
Tennessee’s appeal is consolidated with the Ohio appeal in the Sixth Circuit (No. 26-5235). The date is taken from later opinions that cite the ruling.
Who wonKalshiagainst Tennessee
The opinion itself was not read for this entry. The winner is known from a later opinion, a docket or a report, and the reasons are not stated here.
Assad (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2026), footnote 2 (opens in a new tab)
Jan 2026
Mass. Super. Ct.Favors the stateTaken from a later opinion that cites it
A Massachusetts trial court enjoins Kalshi.
Commonwealth v. Kalshi (preliminary injunction against Kalshi)
The state supreme judicial court (SJC-13906) took the case; it was reportedly argued in early May. No decision was found as of Sept. 21.
Who wonMassachusettsagainst Kalshi
The opinion itself was not read for this entry. The winner is known from a later opinion, a docket or a report, and the reasons are not stated here.
Williams (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2026), citing the Massachusetts ruling (opens in a new tab)
Oct 2025
D. Nev.Favors the stateTaken from a later opinion that cites it
A second Nevada court denies a preliminary injunction to a different exchange.
Crypto.com / NADEX v. Nevada (preliminary injunction)
Nevada federal courts have gone both ways. The date is taken from later opinions that cite the order; the Ninth Circuit appeal is No. 25-7187.
Who wonNevadaagainst Crypto.com / NADEX
The opinion itself was not read for this entry. The winner is known from a later opinion, a docket or a report, and the reasons are not stated here.
Assad (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2026), footnote 2 (opens in a new tab)
Aug 2025
D. Md.Favors the stateTaken from a later opinion that cites it
A Maryland court denies Kalshi a preliminary injunction.
KalshiEX v. Martin, 793 F. Supp. 3d 667
Later courts cite this ruling as the first to reject preemption at the district level. The appeal, No. 25-1892, was argued in the Fourth Circuit on May 7, 2026.
Who wonMarylandagainst Kalshi
Why
- Later courts cite it as the first district ruling to reject preemption.
The opinion itself was not read for this entry. The winner is known from a later opinion, a docket or a report.
Williams (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2026), citing Martin (opens in a new tab)
Apr 2025
D.N.J.Favors Kalshi (federal preemption)Taken from a later opinion that cites it
Kalshi wins a preliminary injunction against New Jersey.
KalshiEX v. Flaherty (preliminary injunction)
This is the order the Third Circuit affirmed on April 6, 2026. The date is taken from later opinions that cite it.
Who wonKalshiagainst New Jersey
Why
- The Third Circuit affirmed this order on April 6, 2026, on the grounds set out below.
The opinion itself was not read for this entry. The winner is known from a later opinion, a docket or a report.
Assad (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2026), procedural history (opens in a new tab)
D. Nev.Favors Kalshi (federal preemption)Taken from a later opinion that cites it
Kalshi wins a preliminary injunction against Nevada.
KalshiEX v. Hendrick (first preliminary injunction)
The first of the district rulings that later courts of appeals reviewed. The date is taken from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Assad, which reviews the later dissolution of this injunction.
Who wonKalshiagainst Nevada
The opinion itself was not read for this entry. The winner is known from a later opinion, a docket or a report, and the reasons are not stated here.
Assad (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2026), procedural history (opens in a new tab)
How the positions have moved
- KalshiThen2024 D.C. Cir. brief: 'gaming' means playing games for stakes; a contract on a sporting outcome is the classic example and Congress did not want sports betting on derivatives markets.→NowSports contracts are swaps outside 'gaming', within CFTC exclusive jurisdiction, while marketed as 'the first app for legal sports betting in all 50 states'.
- KalshiThenArgued contract-by-contract that sports outcomes are swaps because sponsors, advertisers and networks bear financial consequences.→NowAt the Minnesota hearing argued that any contract traded on a DCM is within exclusive jurisdiction so swap status is irrelevant; the court expressly declined to rule on that unbriefed theory.
- KalshiThenCourt-first strategy: preliminary injunctions against state cease-and-desist letters (NJ, NV, NY, OH, MD).→NowAdds an administrative route: Aug 1 market-emergency notice to the CFTC citing Core Principles 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12 and 21, producing the Aug 11 order to keep trading, plus removal of NY's suit.
- CFTCThen2011 rule 40.11 adopted to 'prevent gambling through the futures markets'; 2024 statement that the CFTC 'is not a gaming regulator'; 2023 disapproval of Kalshi election contracts; Feb 2026 withdrawal of its 2024 proposal.→NowPlaintiff against states (US v. New York, US v. Minnesota, nine suits per NJ), amicus for Kalshi in the 9th Cir., and Jun 10 2026 NPRM defining 'gaming' to include professional sports yet calling aggregate-outcome sports contracts unlikely to be contrary to the public interest.
- StatesThenDissent-style theory: even if sports bets are swaps, no field or conflict preemption (Roth, J.).→NowNJ's petition argues twice over: sports bets are not swaps AND no preemption regardless, adding the 2(e) casino-illegality reductio, major questions and Learning Resources v. Trump.
- TribesThenAmici (Indian Gaming Association and others) arguing Kalshi 'override[s] the entire purpose and function of IGRA' in the 6th and 9th Circuits.→NowDirect plaintiffs under IGRA (Blue Lake Rancheria, Chicken Ranch): 9th Cir. Sep 16 2026 found likely success and held the CEA neither covers sports contracts nor, alternatively, displaces IGRA.
What the facts have done
- Over 90% of 2025 trades and 95% of revenue were sports; contracts include prop bets, spreads and parlays ('combos'); Kalshi advertised 'the first app for legal sports betting in all 50 states'.
- The hedging frame failed on the facts: the court finds the contracts create risk for consumers; the no-house/no-odds distinction is dismissed as legally irrelevant, and the Kalshi Trading affiliate acting as market maker weakens it factually.
- The opinion pairs a Raiders -7.5 bet at Caesars Sportsbook with the same trade on Kalshi to find the 'substance' of the product; the functional comparison carries into Blue Lake.
- The parties stipulated there were no disputed material facts and the record was on paper; the loss turned on legal framing and on Kalshi's failure to prove concrete DCM-status risk ('the CFTC has not altered Kalshi’s DCM status').
- Land footprint: Blue Lake holds about 26 acres of trust and fee land in Humboldt County and Chicken Ranch about 40 acres in Tuolumne County. Size did not matter because the holding turns on where the user stands when entering the contract, not where Kalshi's systems sit.
- Procedural history as fact pattern: California's bad-faith negotiation, a court-appointed mediator's selection of the Tribes' proposal, California's refusal to consent, then secretarial procedures issued Jan. 31, 2024. That sequence let the panel say no compact partner exists and procedures are the 'final remedy'.
The statute, and the history before the lawsuits
The rulings on the other tabs argue over a handful of provisions. Here they are in plain terms, with where each one is fought, and the regulatory history that came before the lawsuits.
7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A)
Exclusive jurisdiction
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over swaps and futures traded on a designated contract market. Kalshi’s case for preemption starts here: if its contracts are swaps, the states cannot regulate them.
Where it is fought3d Cir., Apr. 6, 2026, 9th Cir., Aug. 28, 2026
7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(ii)
The swap definition
Added by the Dodd-Frank Act on July 21, 2010. A swap includes a contract that pays out on the occurrence of “an event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence.” Whether a sports contract fits is the question on which the Third and Ninth Circuits part.
Where it is fought3d Cir., Apr. 6, 2026, 9th Cir., Aug. 28, 2026, S.D.N.Y., July 7, 2026
7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)
The Special Rule
The CFTC may find an event contract contrary to the public interest, and bar its listing, if it involves activity unlawful under federal or state law, terrorism, assassination, war, gaming, or similar activity. Kalshi reads it as proof that Congress left the gaming decision to the CFTC. The states read it as proof that gaming is a separate field. The CFTC proposed factors for sports contracts on June 10, 2026.
Where it is fought9th Cir., Aug. 28, 2026, CFTC, June 10, 2026
7 U.S.C. § 7(d); 17 C.F.R. §§ 40.2, 40.11
Designation, core principles and self-certification
An exchange must meet twenty-three core principles to be a designated contract market; one requires that its contracts not be readily susceptible to manipulation. It lists a new contract by certifying it to the CFTC the business day before, and the CFTC does not approve it. Rule 40.11(a) bars swaps on an excluded commodity that involve, relate to or reference gaming, which is why the meaning of “gaming” is contested.
Where it is fought9th Cir., Aug. 28, 2026, CFTC, Aug. 11, 2026
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii)
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
A tribe may sue to enjoin class III gaming conducted in violation of its compact or secretarial procedures. This is the route by which the tribes reached Kalshi, and it does not depend on the Commodity Exchange Act.
Where it is fought9th Cir., Sept. 16, 2026
Before the lawsuits
- 1992The CFTC issues its first no-action letter to the Iowa Electronic Markets, a small academic market for political events. A superseding letter follows in 1993.
- 2004HedgeStreet is designated a contract market to list binary options. It relaunches as Nadex in 2009.
- July 21, 2010The Dodd-Frank Act adds the swap definition and the Special Rule, and bans box-office futures.
- Nov. 26, 2012The CFTC files an enforcement action against Intrade.
- Oct. 29, 2014The CFTC issues a no-action letter to PredictIt. It withdraws the letter in August 2022.
- 2020Kalshi is designated a contract market.
- Jan. 3, 2022The CFTC settles its enforcement action against Polymarket.
- Sept. 22, 2023The CFTC prohibits Kalshi’s congressional-control contracts.
- May 10, 2024The CFTC proposes a rule on event contracts.
- Sept. 6, 2024A district court vacates the CFTC’s prohibition of Kalshi’s contracts. On October 2 the D.C. Circuit denies the CFTC a stay.
- Feb. 4, 2026Under a new chairman, the CFTC withdraws the 2024 proposal. The rulings on the other tabs follow.
The provisions are the ones the opinions on the other tabs quote. The history is condensed from the firm’s earlier guide and records what the CFTC and the courts did on the dates given; these dates were not re-read against the agencies’ own documents for this update, as the rulings were.
Still to be decided
- Sixth Circuit merits decision (Nos. 26-3196, 26-5235)Argued July 30. No decision on the docket as of Sept. 8.
- Fourth Circuit, Martin (No. 25-1892)Argued May 7. No decision as of the Sept. 9–10 docket.
- Second Circuit, Williams appeal (No. 26-1835)Injunction motion referred to a panel July 29.
- Seventh Circuit, Wisconsin appeals (Nos. 26-2675, 26-2696)District case stayed Sept. 8 pending the appeals.
- Supreme Court, New Jersey’s certiorari petition (No. 26-299)Docketed Sept. 8. Response due Oct. 8; Kalshi moved for an extension Sept. 18.
- New York v. Kalshi (No. 1:26-cv-06550)Removed July 31. Motion to remand fully briefed Aug. 28.
- United States and CFTC v. New York (No. 1:26-cv-03404)No ruling found as of Sept. 21.
- Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC-13906)Reportedly argued in early May. No decision found.
- CFTC public-interest rulemaking (RIN 3038-AF65)Proposed June 10. No final rule found.